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Introduction
The hisToricaL significance of influential thinkers and writers like Suzuki Daisetsu 鈴木大拙 (1870–1966) is measured not only in their 
printed legacy but in the cultural influence of their ideas upon its listeners 
and readers. In this sense, D. T. Suzuki, as he is usually known in the West, 
can be said to have played a unique role as one of the most influential 
“patriarchs of transmission” of Buddhism to the West in the modern period. 
Because of his position as the first and for many years the only Japanese 
scholar and practitioner of Zen who wrote frequently and coherently in 
English, today people speak of “Suzuki Zen” and among Western scholars 
of the Zen tradition, one could even point to a line between Suzuki and 
post-Suzuki writing that slowly emerged in the 1980s under the impact of 
Western scholars who came to Japan to study under post-Suzuki figures 
like Yanagita Seizan and Ishii Shūdō. However, any appraisal of Suzuki’s 
influence must take into consideration differences between his reception 
in Japan and in the West. Considering the body of contemporary writing 
about Suzuki in the light of his writings in both Japanese and English, one 
is struck by the nearly complete absence of discussion in English about his 
writings on Pure Land Buddhism.1 While Suzuki is considered primarily 
a student of the literature and culture of the Zen tradition in both Japan 
and the West, he also devoted considerable time to essays on Pure Land 
themes throughout his career that have been widely read in Japan, very 
little of which has found its way into English to date. In this regard, it is 
1 One exception is the recent work by Elisabetta Porcu (2008).
28
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  3 9 ,  2
worth noting that one of the few Japanese scholars to attempt a biographical 
sketch of Suzuki was Bandō Shōjun, a scholar of Pure Land literature.2 In 
this essay I will first show how Suzuki regarded Pure Land rather than Zen 
as the dominant form of Japanese religious consciousness and then offer an 
analysis of how he understood some of the more potent signs, symbols, and 
doctrines of that form of Buddhism.
Ultimately it is this last question—Suzuki’s own religious perspec-
tive—on which I hope to shed some light. I will examine four topics 
among the many aspects of Suzuki’s fascination with Pure Land thought 
that are relevant to that query: (1) the role of the study of Shinran within 
Suzuki’s oeuvre, (2) his investigations of the problematic of jiriki 自力 and 
tariki 他力, (3) issues connected to his incomplete yet landmark translation 
of the Kyōgyōshinshō 教行信証 by Shinran 親鸞 (1173–1263), and (4) his 
controversial decision to translate hongan 本願, the “vows” or “resolutions” 
(Skt. pūrva-praṇidhāna) associated with Amitābha (Amida)3 Buddha, as 
“prayers.”
The Appeal of Shinran
Although a thorough study of Suzuki’s life and work that critically 
established the place of his Pure Land writings within all of his works 
would surely be most fruitful, it would be a Herculean task considering the 
extraordinary volume of writings he has left us: the recent and expanded 
edition of his complete works—only those in the Japanese language—
comes to thirty-eight volumes. Although the first publication by Suzuki that 
explicitly deals with Pure Land Buddhism was a co-translation of Shinran’s 
biography that was published in 1911, there is evidence of Suzuki’s 
attraction to Pure Land thought as early as the turn of that century. 
In 1902, Suzuki publishes a short article in Japanese in which he ex-
pounds on three passages from the Chinese Buddhist canon,4 one of which 
mentions the word hongan-riki 本願力 to describe the working of the dharma 
2 See Bandō 1993.
3 The name “Amida” is the Japanese pronunciation of 阿弥陀 , pronounced Amituo or 
Amito in Mandarin. This form is an abbreviated transliteration of the names Amitābha or 
Amitāyus, both of which refer to the same buddha. Since this article is primarily concerned 
with Japanese language discourse, hereafter I will use the Japanese pronunciation Amida in 
reference to this buddha.
4 “Dokkyō sansoku” 読経三則, originally published in the journal Shin bukkyō 新佛教 vol. 
3, no. 10, pp. 285–288, and reprinted in SDZ at vol. 30, pp. 289–91.
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body in order to spiritually aid living beings. Although this is a use of the 
term in a generic sense, Suzuki’s exposition on the passage is revealing in 
that he associates this generic hongan of all buddhas with the particular 
hongan of Amida Buddha. Another remarkable aspect of this article is 
Suzuki’s critical reference to the translation of this phrase into English 
as “the Power of the former prayer(s) made by the Tathāgata”5—a rather 
odd translation for this concept which I will discuss in some detail below. 
In addition, in 1909, he publishes a fifteen-page article in English entitled 
“The Development of Mahayana Buddhism”6 in the first volume of The 
Buddhist Review, the journal of the Buddhist Society of Great Britain. 
There he contrasts karma and pariṇāma (Jpn. ekō 回向), commenting that 
whereas karma is unrelenting, pariṇāma is accepting. In the 1902 piece, he 
comments that “those who believe in tariki” are those who believe in the 
Christian doctrine of “Let thy Will be done,” a view that echoes his later 
comment about pariṇāma being “accepting,” itself a statement that assumes 
Shinran’s understanding of the term. In these two early works, we can see 
his sympathy with the Pure Land stance that living beings simply cannot 
overcome their karmic weight and are overjoyed to find a salvific force that 
aids them.
Suzuki’s interest increasingly turns toward a creative interpretation of 
Pure Land Buddhism beginning in 1938, running through the war years, 
and into the postwar period. The volume of his writings about Zen from 
the 1940s onwards is modest by comparison to his works on Pure Land. 
This shift toward Pure Land is exemplified by two of his publications that 
appeared in December of 1948. The first is a thirty-two page booklet on Zen 
in English entitled The Ten Oxherding Pictures.7 The second is a 400-page 
book on Pure Land in Japanese entitled Myōkōnin 妙好人, or Pure Land 
“saints”—one of the most important topics in Japanese Pure Land.8 Today, 
Suzuki’s work on the myōkōnin is considered a classic, and one of his major 
contributions to Japanese Buddhist scholarship.
His longer pieces of writing (more than ten pages) on Zen themes in 
Japanese after the war are Japanese translations of works that he wrote 
originally in English, such as Kegon no kenkyū 華厳の研究 (1955) which 
5 SDZ, vol. 30, p. 290.
6 Suzuki 1909.
7 Probably one of the first publications on this theme in English.
8 We can infer that he worked on this material during the war since his first publication on 
myōkōnin came in 1947.
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includes a translation of a long essay from Essays in Zen, Third Series 
(1934), or Zen to seishinteki bunseki 禅と精神的分析 (1960), a translation of 
Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis (also 1960). Although significant works 
by Suzuki on Zen continued to appear in English, many of them are actually 
revised versions of earlier publications. Even his Zen and Japanese Culture 
(1959), which garnered so much recent attention, is an expanded edition of 
his 1938 original. Suzuki’s philological work on texts important in the Zen 
tradition, such as the Laṅkāvātara and Gandhavyūha sutras or the Shenhui 
神会 (684–758) and Huineng 慧能 (638–713) materials from Dunhuang 敦
煌 all date from the prewar period. However after the war, his major works 
are the English translation of Shinran’s Kyōgyōshinshō (1973) and modern 
Japanese translations of the diaries of Asahara Saichi 浅原才市 (1850–
1932), one of the myōkōnin. The lectures he gave at the New York Buddhist 
Academy in 1957 and 1958 were all on Pure Land themes, and were later 
published as the book Shin Buddhism. This book has been reprinted a 
number of times and the Japanese translation continues to sell well today. It 
has also been translated into German, Italian, Spanish, Dutch, and Chinese.
In our attempt to discern the role of Pure Land Buddhism in Suzuki’s 
work, we are rather fortunate that Suzuki himself reflected on the 
significance and role of the Pure Land teachings within his work Nihonteki 
reisei 日本的霊性 (Japanese Spirituality, 1944).9 In these essays, Suzuki 
elaborated his view of the nature of Japanese religious consciousness. 
Suzuki’s project was not a retrospective on his own work, but these essays 
nonetheless serve as a guide to his thinking about the meaning of Buddhism 
and Shinto (and Christianity) within the context of, or even as a product 
of, Japanese cultural history. Although they predate his most extensive 
Pure Land writings (most published in the early 1960s), these essays offer 
a useful and, for Suzuki, an unusually critical perspective on Japanese 
Buddhism as a whole and the place of Pure Land Buddhism within it.
Despite Suzuki’s renown at the time as a champion of Zen, in chapter 
after chapter of Nihonteki reisei, he repeatedly states that for him it is the 
thought of Shinran and Hōnen 法然 (1133–1212) that expresses Japanese 
religious consciousness most deeply. When Suzuki discusses Kamakura-
period Zen in Nihonteki reisei, he does so only in broad, general terms, 
discussing only the thought of Dōgen 道元 (1200–1253) and even then 
9 Volume Eight of Suzuki Daisetsu zenshū (hereafter SDZ). In 1972 the Japanese Ministry 
of Education, with support from UNESCO, published a translation by Norman Waddell 
under the title Japanese Spirituality.
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only by comparison with Shinran. By contrast, his discussion of Hōnen 
and Shinran is detailed and lengthy, and includes their disciples and the 
development of their lineages.
Assumptions that Suzuki was a “purveyor of Zen” are deep-seated in 
the West, and Nihonteki reisei has been used to espouse this view. Robert 
Sharf contends in his essay, “The Zen of Japanese Nationalism,” that Suzuki 
claimed “Zen and Zen alone constitutes the heart of Japanese spirituality”10 
by citing the essays in Nihonteki reisei. Sharf’s critique of the nihonjinron 
日本人論 nationalism in Nihonteki reisei is well-argued and often cited 
and although I agree with his view that Suzuki makes a number of 
irrational claims in those essays that does indeed reflect a form of religious 
nationalism, I cannot agree with the inferences he makes regarding the 
place of Zen in these essays, and consequently about the kind of nationalism 
favored by Suzuki. 
The thesis of Nihonteki reisei is that truly Japanese religiosity emerged in 
the Kamakura period. This is outlined in an Introduction and then restated 
and developed in detail over four chapters which are the heart of the book. 
Quoting only from the problematic translation Japanese Spirituality and 
only from the Introduction, Sharf fails to mention that Zen has a decidedly 
minor role in the book and in Suzuki’s overall thesis. Even the discussion 
on Zen in the Introduction is cursory and reaches no more than two pages, 
while the discussion on Pure Land that follows is covered at three times 
that length and in much more detail.11 Chapters 1 and 2 then discuss 
developments in Japanese religion in the Heian and Kamakura periods with 
the focus clearly on the rise of Pure Land and nenbutsu. Chapter 3 is on 
Hōnen and his concept of nenbutsu, and Chapter 4 is on the Pure Land saints 
known as myōkōnin. When Sharf quotes Suzuki’s statements expressing the 
prevailing view of his generation that there was a dawning of a new religious 
consciousness in the Kamakura period, once again he incorrectly glosses 
those statements as being about Zen whereas Suzuki’s focus is clearly on 
Pure Land. Sharf does this most explicitly when he alters a quotation from 
Suzuki about the deep imprint that Kamakura-period religiosity has left on 
the Japanese psyche by adding his own Zen hermeneutic in brackets; to wit: 
“Today, seven hundred years after [the blossoming of Zen, Zen] has come 
in substance to be the basis for the Japanese character, thought, religious 
10 Sharf 1995, p. 155, n. 71.
11 Even in Chapter 2, Zen is only mentioned in very brief terms concluding with a 
promise to revisit this topic at another time.
32
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  3 9 ,  2
faith, and esthetic taste.”12 But this insertion is unwarranted: this section of 
Nihonteki reisei that Sharf is quoting13 is not specifically about Zen. Rather, 
it is about the spirituality of Kamakura-period Buddhism as a whole. And 
following this, when Suzuki rhetorically asks how he would characterize 
Japanese religions in the Kamakura period, he answers by listing Pure Land 
Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, Nichiren 日蓮 Buddhism, and Ryōbu Shintō 両部
神道, in that order. Clearly there is no hint of the primacy of Zen anywhere 
in this scheme.
And if one might think that this focus on Pure Land reflects Suzuki only 
when writing for a Japanese audience and that Sharf’s reading reflects 
Suzuki’s leanings when writing for the West, compare with a similar essay 
written in English entitled “Japanese Thought,” published in 1952 in a two-
volume encyclopedia of philosophy edited by S. Radhakrishnan. Here is how 
Suzuki described the new religiosity of the Kamakura period in that piece:
It was in the thirteenth century that the Japanese masses were 
really awakened to the religious consciousness and along with it a 
philosophical reflection on reality. . . . The fact is that the teaching 
of Hōnen and Shinran really and truly echoes what was then 
moving in the hearts and minds of the Japanese people generally. 
It was not their artificial production, it was simply the response 
to the spiritual needs of the people in those days. Buddhism then 
became the religion of the Japanese who re-created it to satisfy 
their requirements. The Pure Land School of Buddhism is the 
creation of the Japanese religious genius.14
In this essay Zen is not even mentioned, suggesting a further refinement 
of the Pure Land focus in Nihonteki reisei right after the war. He does 
discuss Bashō and the concept of sabi, but neither are identified as Zen. If 
anything, Suzuki might be taken to task for some bias toward Pure Land 
in both these examples; but after reading Nihonteki reisei and “Japanese 
Thought,” it is exceedingly difficult to see how one could infer that Suzuki 
felt “true” Japanese spirituality was about Zen.15 One reason why I want 
12 Sharf 1995, p. 129.
13 SDZ 8, p. 51.
14 Suzuki 1952, pp. 600–601.
15 In fact, this conflation of Zen and Japanese Buddhism is not limited to Sharf’s com-
ments on Suzuki, but occurs in Sharf’s references to Zeami 世阿弥 (1363–1443) and Tanizaki 
Jun’ichirō 谷崎潤一郎 (1886–1965) as well.
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to clarify the role that Pure Land Buddhism played in Suzuki’s religious 
worldview is that the English translation of Nihonteki reisei and the 
Radhakrishnan volume have both been out of print for decades but the view 
of Suzuki as promoting a form of Zen nationalism remains widespread.16
It goes without saying that the scholars of Japanese Buddhism are in a 
continuous process of re-assessing its history as new materials are discovered 
and the authority perceived in methodologies and theories of interpretation 
ebb and flow. I mention this because in reading Nihonteki reisei, it is 
important to keep in mind that Suzuki was writing from essentially a prewar 
perspective and thus this work (and others) embody notions that a great 
many people find outdated and even embarrassing today, more than sixty 
years later. He is quite dismissive of Heian-period Buddhism, for example, 
as overly intellectualized, overly ritualized, and at times he uses the word 
“feminine” to describe Heian culture and thought. His usage is not explicitly 
pejorative, but insofar as he contrasts Heian Buddhism with the new forms 
of Buddhism that arose in the Kamakura period which Suzuki finds to be 
much more refreshing, honest, spiritually compelling and “masculine,” the 
gender-bias implication is obvious. Suzuki’s essay reflects the prevailing 
opinion of prewar scholarship that hailed the new schools of Kamakura-
period Buddhism as wholly different and somehow more “Japanese.” 
That perspective is de rigueur for his generation. What is unexpected and 
noteworthy for many, however, is his elevation of Hōnen and Shinran as the 
quintessential spokesmen for this new religious outlook—rather than famous 
Zen figures like Dōgen, Keisan 瑩山 (1268–1325), or Eisai 榮西 (1141–
1215), or innovative thinkers based in traditional religious orders like Myōe 
明恵 (1173–1232) from the Kegon school or Jōkei 貞慶 (1155 –1213) from 
the Hossō. 
While I have stressed the importance of Suzuki’s religious writings on 
subjects other than Zen here, one can discern nevertheless an approach 
in these works that reflects religious values that I think we can identify 
as “Zen-like” in that they present themes common in Zen lore regarding 
religious experience. Two of these themes that come to mind immediately are 
the valorization of religious experience over the intellectual understanding 
16 In discussing Suzuki’s views on Pure Land in Nihonteki reisei as opposed to his 
statements on Zen, I do not mean to imply that “Pure Land as nihonjinron” is somehow a 
better argument than “Zen as nihonjinron.” There is much evidence to suggest that in some 
of his writings, Suzuki did indeed entertain such prejudices, and Nihonteki reisei is probably 
the easiest place to find examples of them.
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of religious “thought,” and a certain hostility directed toward that form of 
intellectual understanding as hindering rather than helping the “experience.” 
One of Suzuki’s major contributions to the history of Japanese Buddhist 
studies is his work on the myōkōnin, as mentioned above, the choice of 
which reflects the centrality of experience in Suzuki’s understanding of 
religion. Although not the focus of this particular study, it is worth stating 
that Suzuki is clearly drawn to these individuals because they present 
unambiguous examples of both themes stated here as held in common 
by the Zen and Pure Land traditions: that is, the authority of religious 
experience and the pitfalls of the intellectual study of Buddhist thought. The 
paradox here, of course, is that Suzuki’s own career was not as a Zen master 
leading committed individuals in a zendō 禅堂 but as an intellectual who 
wrote and spoke about religion. However, whether for historical or personal 
reasons (and probably both), Suzuki was always attracted to commonality 
among different religious traditions, and frequently sought quotes from 
one to illuminate another. He is well known for doing this with Christianity 
and Buddhism, and his writings on Pure Land and Zen often exhibit the 
same pattern. From as early as 1923, for example, Suzuki is comparing and 
contrasting Zen and Pure Land approaches to Buddhism. I am referring to 
what is, to my knowledge, the earliest example of his exploration of the 
intersection of the two approaches through their common use of the term 
anjin 安心17 in a four-part essay in the Buddhist newspaper Chūgai nippō 中
外日報 entitled, “Godō to anjin ketsujō” 悟道と安心決定 (Awakening to the 
Path and Confirmation of the Settled Mind).18 Anjin (Ch. anxin) throughout 
the Sino-Japanese world refers to conclusive religious attainment but it is 
particularly prominent in the Zen and Pure Land traditions, and here Suzuki 
compares its description in both.
Although such comparisons are admirable and affirming, they can mask 
important differences in brotherly light. For this reason, Suzuki’s writing on 
the similarities of Zen and Pure Land, such as these anjin essays, are less 
interesting to this reader than his struggle to come to terms with seemingly 
unbridgeable difference. Here it is worth pointing out, however, that all of 
Suzuki’s early writings on Pure Land (however lengthy) occur within the 
framework of a comparison with Zen, reflecting his greater knowledge of 
the Zen literary tradition. In some sense, this approach never really changes, 
17 Suzuki actually dealt with anjin in one of his first publications, “Anjin ritsumei no chi” 安心
立命の地, which appeared in two parts in the journal Shūkyō, vol. 26 (1893) and vol. 28 (1894).
18 SDZ, vol. 17, pp. 258–66.
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for though he knows the three Pure Land sutras designated by Hōnen to 
be authoritative, Suzuki’s interpretation never exceeds what might be 
referred to as the “Suzuki perspective” which is limited by (1) his focus 
on individual religious attainment, and (2) his persistence in viewing Pure 
Land from within the Shin tradition. This perspective approaches the Pure 
Land scriptures through Tanluan 曇鸞 (476–542?), Shinran, and the later 
Shin tradition, most notably Rennyo 蓮如 (1415–1499), along with the Edo- 
and Meiji-period myōkōnin. His familiarity with Chan literature of the Tang 
and Song is never matched by a similar knowledge Pure Land literature—
rarely does he delve into the doctrinally complex legacy of Tang or Song 
period Pure Land thinkers such as Daochuo 道綽 (562–645), Shandao 善導 
(613–681), Huiyuan 慧遠 (523–592), Jiacai 加才 (c. 7th century), Zhiyi 智
顗 (538 –597), or Yuanzhao 元照 (1048–1116). And even for Japan, there is 
little evidence that he was particularly familiar with the writings of Genshin 
源信 (942–1017) or Hōnen, not to mention Shinran’s contemporaries. 
Certainly there are limitations to Suzuki’s critical stance on the history 
of Chan/Zen given that, again, his was a prewar perspective. By contrast, 
however, I think it is also fair to conclude on balance that whatever degree 
of historicism Suzuki brought to his study of that tradition is conspicuously 
absent in his writings on Pure Land. Suzuki’s historical study of Zen may 
have served to support his religious impulses or his religious impulses 
may have served to motivate his historical study of Zen. But in the case of 
Pure Land there is no similar pretense of “speaking for the tradition.” What 
is quite apparent in the dialogs with Pure Land thinkers published after 
the war, Suzuki seems to stand outside marveling at what goes on. What 
appears to have captured his interest were concepts, such as tariki, myōgō 
名号, hongan and nenbutsu, along with what he saw as testimonials of 
personal religious experience in Pure Land figures such as myōkōnin, which 
he could compare with literary evidence of the same experience in the Zen 
tradition. Concern with concepts and testimonials characterizes perhaps 
ninety percent of his writing on Pure Land themes, and both also allowed 
him to explore how Pure Land Buddhism is and is not like Christianity, 
particularly Christian mysticism. This explains why, for example, in his 
book Jōdokei shisōron 浄土系思想論 (Essays on Pure Land Thought), 
Shandao is only mentioned specifically for the passage in his writings that 
triggered Hōnen’s awakening,19 and his continual interest in myōkōnin, 
whom he referred to in English as “tariki mystics.” It is thus not surprising 
19 See SDZ, vol. 6, p. 130.
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that he always has an eye out for examples when both concerns came 
together, as in his long essay on nenbutsu and kōan practice.20
Dialoging Zen and Pure Land: Essays on jiriki and tariki
Jiriki (self-power) and tariki (other-power) are terms originally used 
in Northern Song documents without garnering much attention. In the 
Kamakura period, however, they become central to the normative discourse 
used to distinguish Pure Land Buddhism, which holds that the determinate 
factor in liberation is the other power of Amida, from other paths that 
prefer the conception that one can attain liberation by one’s own efforts. 
The general usage of these terms is based on a rather facile identification of 
“jiriki” with the more traditional, “meditative” approaches to praxis such as 
early Buddhism, Zen, Yogācāra, and the Vajrayāna traditions, as opposed to 
the designation of what we might call “faith-based” traditions of Buddhism, 
specifically Pure Land, as “tariki.” This identification was presented by the 
Pure Land exegetes of the Kamakura period as a way to define their own 
approach as a commensurate alternative. This is not the place to discuss how 
these concepts were born or their hermeneutic development, but suffice it 
to say, jiriki and tariki only make sense in terms of each other because all 
religious epiphanies reflect a dimension of knowledge and power wholly 
new, i.e., beyond the known self. Thus jiriki and tariki fade in meaning 
unless used as a pair. In modern usage, the words have been transformed into 
synonyms for “practice” and “faith” for many, particularly in some aspects of 
the Shin tradition. They often appear as rubrics representing how one views 
this or that tradition of Buddhism, especially in terms of how the sectarian 
legacies of the Edo period self-identify today: e.g., Zen is jiriki, Shin is 
tariki, despite the absurd reductionism of thinking that Zen could ever be a 
tradition devoid of faith and likewise that Shin could be devoid of practice.
Nonetheless when people who “study” Zen talk about Pure Land and vice 
versa, the topic of jiriki and tariki inevitably seems to come up. Suzuki was 
fascinated with the jiriki-tariki problematic and wrote on it repeatedly. He 
was fond of bringing in discussion of this topic in all his Pure Land writings, 
and there are at least four essays identically called “Jiriki to tariki” 自力
と他力 (Self-power and other-power) published in 1911, 1924, 1926, and 
20 “The Koan Exercise and the Nembutsu,” in Suzuki 1933, pp. 146–54. See similar senti-
ments in an essay (Suzuki 1935) written after a trip to China in 1934 where he spoke with Yin-
guang 印光, a strong advocate of the study and practice of both Chan/Zen and nianfo/nenbutsu.
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1965, in addition to a dialog with Soga Ryōjin 曽我量深 (1875 –1971) on the 
topic published posthumously in 1972.21 It is my guess that he saw in this 
rhetoric a convenient way to focus on the paradox that Mahayana Buddhism 
presents as a system in which everyone is promised that he or she can 
become a Buddha, yet no one actually does. Although Suzuki does not 
identify the jiriki-tariki problematic as a specifically Japanese approach, 
there is little doubt that he was well-aware of the lack of any analog in 
Sanskrit or even most canonical Chinese exegetical writings.
In his 1911 essay, “Jiriki to tariki,” Suzuki begins with a disclaimer 
about his knowledge, confessing that it was insufficient to write a credible 
biography of Shinran or even discuss the origins of the Shin sect of 
Buddhism. This comment serves to frame his comments on jiriki and tariki 
as not coming from an historical perspective. In other words, Suzuki is 
informing his reader that this essay is not going to be a critical look at the 
origins and development of the notions of jiriki and tariki but should be read 
instead as a kind of philosophically or psychologically creative response 
to the implications of the jiriki-tariki problematic itself. Here is a concrete 
example of Suzuki looking at Shin as a source of information about pertinent 
religious issues that “Suzuki the seeker” is struggling to unpack, and not as 
an historical enigma that “Suzuki the scholar” needs to unravel.
Suzuki’s interest in this article is two-fold: (1) what are the implications 
of the jiriki and tariki ways of thinking, and (2) how are we to understand 
the relationship between the Zen and Pure Land traditions in this regard as 
representatives of each? Regarding the former, he offers a list of opposites 
that might be understood in terms of jiriki-tariki as a general approach to 
understanding the human experience. Referring to these as two poles of 
a conflict or at least competition, he offers the examples of affect versus 
knowledge, believing (shin 信) versus discriminating (funbetsu 分別), one’s 
heart versus one’s head, materialism versus idealism, and so forth, continuing 
with a fairly long list of what the two positions of jiriki and tariki symbolize 
to him. Despite the fact that he calls this pairing “the two extremes of the 
religious world” and refers to them as being “in conflict” (arasoi 争い), 
suggesting a rivalry, many of the associations offered here suggest different 
aspects of the same structure or approach. Thus we also have the process of 
seeing versus the eyes as the organ of sight, mind (seishin 精神) versus form 
21 SDZ, vol. 30, pp. 434–37; vol. 31, pp. 285–92; pp. 336–39; vol. 19, pp. 523–26; vol. 
20, pp. 315–17. The dialog with Soga appears in Suzuki Daisetsu zadanshū 鈴木大拙座談集 
(hereafter SDZD), vol. 5, pp. 135–39.
38
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  3 9 ,  2
(keigai 形骸), syncretic versus analytic, transmission outside the teachings 
(associated with Zen) versus the written word (associated with Shin), or 
interior versus exterior. In the end, he concludes that liberation or salvation 
transcends all such distinctions, and the religious experience of people 
coming from either side will end up in the same place. This is a rather strong 
expression of faith on his part, and shows that from the beginning of his 
writing career—he was forty-one in 1911—Suzuki was someone of deep 
faith. The essay was printed in a Shin journal called Shūsokan 宗祖観 on the 
occasion of the 650th anniversary of Shinran’s death. This perhaps explains 
the overwhelming focus of the piece on the tariki side. In any case, he states 
that “mysticism is the life of all religion” and those who have such mystical 
experiences will naturally see that whether one comes to the truth from the 
jiriki or the tariki side, they arrive at the same conclusion. Also, despite his 
later positive writings on these two figures, here he takes Swedenborg and 
Jacob Boehme to task for what he sees as an approach that tries too hard to 
explain religion (ugachisugi 穿ちすぎ). The essay is interesting at the very 
least because (1) it defines both jiriki and tariki quite narrowly as Zen and 
Pure Land, (2) it shows Suzuki’s strong sympathy with Shinran and the Shin 
tradition very early in his career, (3) it valorizes religious experience over its 
verbal expression as the sine qua non for giving someone an authoritative 
voice, and (4) he accepts the view of contemporary historians that the Zen 
and Pure Land movements in the Kamakura period were parallel in that 
they arose as a reaction against the theorizing that had come to dominate 
“establishment Buddhism” at that time, and that therefore they both represent 
the assertion of the primacy of experience as an alternative model.
By contrast, the 1924 essay on jiriki and tariki was published in Goshū 
護宗, (Protecting the Order) a journal published by a Zen temple in Kyoto. 
Although Suzuki allows himself to speculate in the 1911 essay on where 
the different approaches of jiriki and tariki might lead, in the 1924 essay he 
is solely concerned with how religious awakening transcends such distinc-
tions. In this piece he does not discuss jiriki and tariki or their implications 
directly. Rather, they are merely implied when he presents his frame of 
how religion is studied and how it should be studied. He argues that the 
study of religion is too often reduced to one or two of its aspects, such as 
rational and superrational, or philosophy and ritual. And while some say 
that religion is based in fear because creation myths are all about awesome 
power, but this sense of fear reminds us of the presence of an other that 
is different from oneself. While not criticizing the tariki claims of Pure 
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Land, Suzuki makes a highly critical statement about Christianity: referring 
to the inevitable rupture that occurs when one senses the presence of the 
superrational, the nondual, he comments that Christianity speaks in a child-
ish way of a heaven where angels who are pure of heart represent ideal 
virtue, but as the childish mind matures an inevitable rupture occurs as one 
becomes aware of their own oppositional relationship with that world, and 
this is a source of suffering. Thus people speak of this in terms of love, but 
to love the unreachable brings suffering. In the infinite world, however, self 
and other are no longer in opposition, as “other is embraced by self, and as a 
result self is completed.”22 Suffering is thus described as something we are 
aware of in the finite world where self and other stand in opposition, where 
their distance is painfully felt, but suffering is absent in the infinite world 
where self and other are fused.23 We also suffer because we try to grasp 
what the other is with reason, which is inevitably insufficient. When reason 
disintegrates into paradox, by its very nature it becomes unsustainable and 
is ruined, but that ruination of reason is precisely where the other is. But 
even those who try to put reason aside often cling to that stance and fail 
because the other is constantly moving. When we can somehow transcend 
being trapped by our reason can we touch that which transcends reason. He 
then quotes from the Biyan lu 碧巖録 (Blue Cliff Record), a kōan collection 
used by the Rinzai school, and discusses the arising of self-awareness based 
on the first four stages of the pratītyasamutpāda doctrine. Ultimately, this 
essay is quite analytical and even doctrinally specific, showing how when 
speaking with his “Zen voice” Suzuki waxes philosophical. The reader is 
given thought-provoking ideas about ji (self) and ta (other), but nothing 
about jiriki and tariki. There were times when he liked to talk about Zen to 
his Pure Land audiences and about Pure Land to his Zen audiences, but this 
was not one of them. This second jiriki-tariki essay is thus using the self-
other dichotomy as a trope to talk about Zen. 
The third essay entitled “Jiriki to tariki” (1926) is also written from the 
perspective of Zen, as it appeared in another Zen publication called Busshin 
佛心 (Buddha-mind). This is a more mature work: though published only 
two years after the previous essay, here Suzuki is much more focused 
on Buddhist issues. For the first time he defines jiriki not as Zen but 
22 SDZ 31, p. 288.
23 This kind of language, particularly because he uses finite and infinite as synonyms for 
impermanent and permanent, strongly echoes Kiyozawa Manshi 清沢満之 (1863–1903) al-
though he is not named.
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as indicative of the much broader rubric of the so-called “path to self-
perfection” or shōdōmon 聖道門, that is, he uses jiriki in the same manner 
as Japanese Pure Land commentators. The shōdōmon language, coined by 
Daochuo, is the Chinese expression of what in Japan came to be called the 
jiriki path. Tariki, on the other hand, is a broader term in Japan and can be 
applied to how people approach nenbutsu practice, for example. Suzuki is 
much more compelling when he initiates his essay in this way. He can also 
then say to his Zen audience, “but after all, the most jiriki among all jiriki 
traditions is Zen.”24 Without dwelling on their differences, Suzuki states 
that a typical scholar sees the divide between jiriki and tariki as steep, but in 
fact when they are carefully examined, what is jiriki seems to be tariki, and 
vice versa. After demonstrating how unquestionably jiriki Zen is, illustrated 
by the intense devotion to practice called for in Zen, Suzuki then asks if the 
awakening experience in Zen—satori 悟—is actually a tariki moment or a 
jiriki moment? The question comes down to the sudden, unexpected nature 
of that awakening. He gives examples of the various words used in Chinese 
Zen texts to express this awakening, and quotes a famous line about 
releasing one’s hold on the edge of a cliff, and after “the end,” coming back 
to life. The “end” here means the end of jiriki and the coming back to life 
is clearly tariki. For the first time in Suzuki’s articles on the subject, we 
see a definition of what jiriki and tariki actually mean from the perspective 
of the individual practitioner: jiriki is the consciousness of effort, and 
tariki is when that consciousness disappears and is replaced by an attitude 
of accepting death. In parallel fashion, in Pure Land it makes no sense to 
speak only of tariki, for tariki has meaning only when one has exhausted 
jiriki. In other words, “tariki exists because jiriki makes it possible.”25 This 
essay is the strongest statement thus far about his frustration with those who 
distinguish Zen and Pure Land on the basis of concepts like jiriki and tariki.
Suzuki’s last essay devoted to jiriki and tariki first appeared in the 
Yomiuri Shinbun in 1965, nearly forty years later. This essay forms the first 
in the book, Daisetsu tsurezure gusa 大拙つれづれ草, a collection of Suzuki’s 
short essays primarily from the early 1960s that was published by the 
Yomiuri Shinbunsha in 1966. This essay is the only one of the four written 
for a general rather than a sectarian audience. He begins with yet another 
definition of jiriki and tariki, explaining that tariki refers to Shin Buddhism, 
and jiriki refers to all other forms of Buddhism, a marked contrast from 
24 SDZ, vol. 31, p. 336.
25 SDZ, vol. 31, p. 339.
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his 1926 piece. This is an explicitly Shin sectarian statement, reflective 
of a self-perception among teachers and writers of Shin that it is unique 
even among all forms of Pure Land Buddhism, a view that seems to have 
gradually grown stronger during the twentieth century. Another example of 
how modern Shin scholarship influenced Suzuki can be found in this article 
in his use of the term zettai tariki 絶対他力, or “absolute other-power.” It 
is quite common for zettai tariki to be used in contemporary Japan as a 
representative label for Shin thought in general or Shinran’s thought in 
particular, but the term is a modern invention. While many people assume 
the phrase was coined by Kiyozawa Manshi, he used terms like zettai mugen 
絶対無限 (absolute infinity) when discussing tariki but did not put them 
together into one phrase. The term originated when Kiyozawa’s essays were 
collected and published after his death and one of his students changed the 
title of his essay, “Tariki no kyūsai” 他力の救済 (The salvation of tariki), to 
“Zettai tariki no daidō” 絶対他力の大道 (The great path of absolute tariki).26 
Suzuki’s use of zettai tariki shows quite clearly that he read Shin scholarship 
and Kiyozawa but, as mentioned above, he shows little knowledge of other 
forms of Pure Land thought and practice. 
This 1965 essay primarily deals with Asahara Saichi, one of the myōkōnin 
that Suzuki spent so much time studying. Saichi offers Suzuki another 
vehicle for demonstrating the unity of Zen and Pure Land religious experi-
ence because Saichi seems to express a view of nenbutsu and of Amida 
Buddha that closely mirrors Suzuki’s own: namely, that it is a kind of mysti-
cal union. In Suzuki’s description, Saichi does not use the nenbutsu to attain 
the Pure Land, he becomes the nenbutsu—he becomes the sacred name of 
the buddha itself. In other words, for Saichi, tariki is a tariki that is beyond 
the jiriki-tariki distinction. By contrast, Suzuki says very little about jiriki 
in this essay, but he does define both jiriki and tariki at the beginning of 
the essay in a way different from his descriptions in the earlier essays dis-
cussed above: “Tariki is attaining the place of confirmed anjin (settled 
mind) by means of the single power of the buddha; jiriki, by contrast, 
wakes up tariki by means of one’s own individual effort.”27 Thus jiriki 
26 The Kiyozawa disciple who came up with the new title was Tada Kanae 多田鼎 (1875–
1937), but many of Kiyozawa’s essays had their titles changed by other people editing them. 
This seems to have been quite common in the Meiji period. The recently re-edited complete 
works of Kiyozawa published by Iwanami Shoten restores all the original language, both 
titles and even some individual words within the essays. 
27 SDZ, vol. 20, p. 315.
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is now defined in terms of—given meaning by—tariki. This view is not 
inconsistent with his 1926 essay on the jiriki-tariki problematic in which he 
borrowed Kiyozawa’s somewhat idealistic formulation that “tariki comes at 
the exhaustion of jiriki” but this statement suggests a process rather than a 
complete reversal in the form of a sudden realization. Since this article was 
written almost two decades after Nihonteki reisei and is consistent with his 
conclusions there that tariki Shinshū lies at the heart of Japanese Buddhism, 
I would argue that what we are seeing here is a mature statement after much 
reflection.
Finally, I would like to refer to a dialog on jiriki and tariki between 
Suzuki and Soga Ryōjin, one of the most influential voices in contemporary 
Shin thought in the modern period.28 In many ways, Soga parallels Suzuki’s 
stance inasmuch as they both are not bound by the traditions of Shin 
dogma, yet Soga also differs from Suzuki in that he is a self-identified 
Shin thinker and, as professor of Shin Buddhism, evidenced much more 
detailed knowledge of the Pure Land doctrinal tradition. As both served 
on the faculty of Otani University in the 1920s and were close to each 
other in age, they were on friendly terms, with Suzuki writing a preface to 
one of Soga’s books. In this preface and other recorded dialogs between 
them, we see the parallel nature of their approach. Soga, however, with his 
precise knowledge of the intellectual tradition within which Shinran was 
operating, is able to offer a contextualization of Shinran’s approach that is 
often missing in Suzuki. In one recorded dialog, Suzuki questions Soga on 
how one comes to have faith, and broaches the topic of tariki. Soga asks 
why he refers to coming to have faith as tariki. Suzuki responds that it is the 
effect of tariki that jiriki is motivated to take action. Suzuki then elaborates 
using the analogy of the activities of “Godhead” in “creating and saving 
the world” which he sees as similar to the buddha’s salvific activity. Suzuki 
here advances his view that the “wish” (negai 願い) of the buddha to save 
others is not the buddha’s own wish but compassion itself, operating on its 
own. Thus to Suzuki, the vows of the buddha are not his vows per se, they 
are everyone’s vows, and their completion symbolizes the buddhahood thus 
attained in everyone. Soga responds:
That [interpretation] is all very fine, but if you interpret things in 
that way . . . something remains that cannot be interpreted away. 
28 This dialog took place on December 8, 1958, at the Miyako Hotel in Kyoto. It was 
originally published in the Shin journal, Shinjin 真人, and is reprinted in SDZD, vol. 5, pp. 
124–50.
43
B L U M :  S TA N D I N G  A L O N E  I N  T H E  FA I T H  O F  N O N - O B E D I E N C E
Even if the principle is understood, in reality this is not how 
things are and this is a big problem.29
Soga does not accept Amida Buddha as “a product of our arbitrary sub-
jectivity,” which he identifies as limited precisely because it is subjective.30 
Suzuki’s response illustrates the depth of his conviction that Amida and all 
he represents can only be understood as something completely internalized 
and therefore understood subjectively. In Suzuki’s words:
Insofar as Amida said that if his vows are not realized he himself 
will not attain perfect awakening and he did attain that awakening 
and the Pure Land was thus created, we can say—perhaps this 
is just my thinking, what I believe myself, or my experience, 
any of these [explanations] will do—but to my thinking as long 
as I myself have not attained buddhahood, as long as I have not 
opened up to perfect awakening, then Amida has not attained 
buddhahood.31
What is of course striking here is that the internalization of Amida is not 
merely as a potential but as an accomplished fact. For Suzuki, the Pure 
Land as an ideal is thus something of one’s own creation, and the vows 
of the Buddha are not something that one would depend on (sugaru) as 
the outside force that enables the individual to accomplish what cannot be 
done on one’s own. I will return to the implications of this statement on 
Suzuki’s view of hongan below, but putting this back into the context of 
jiriki and tariki, it would appear that in Suzuki’s language this tariki is not 
the tariki of jiriki-tariki, which he understands epistemologically but rather 
an ontological tariki, tariki as an ontic presence.
These essays on jiriki and tariki tell us how Suzuki approached Pure 
Land thought and how his approach evolved over time. First, his approach 
changed somewhat depending on his intended audience. And yet, his 
most explicit identification of tariki with Shin Buddhism came in an essay 
directed to a non-Shin audience. The timing of that essay—1965, some 
forty years after his previous efforts—may account for this somewhat. In 
29 SDZD, vol. 5, p. 138.
30 Soga Ryōjin senshū (hereafter SRS), vol. 1, p. 17. But in contrasting objective knowl-
edge and religious knowledge based on faith, Soga states that because faith as the subject is 
itself an inconceivable mystery, there is no further need for an objective Tathāgata separate 
from this subjective faith (SRS, vol. 1, p. 22).
31 SDZD, vol. 5, p. 138.
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his prewar essays, tariki is explained as Pure Land Buddhism or the Pure 
Land Gate (jōdomon 浄土門), a technical term from Chinese Buddhism to 
indicate all forms of Pure Land Buddhism. His shift to an explicitly Shin 
perspective suggests influence from a heightened self-awareness among 
the Shin scholars with whom he associated, something that I have hinted 
at above and that I believe became particularly pronounced in the first 
decades after World War II. The contrast between his identification of Shin 
and his position in Nihonteki reisei, published in 1944, is striking. In that 
publication he is also primarily interested in Shinran, but he makes it clear 
that he does not regard Shinran’s thought to have been particularly different 
from Hōnen’s thought.
But as for what jiriki and tariki actually mean and how they relate to 
each other, Suzuki is remarkably consistent through more than fifty years of 
writing. The key to understanding both is religious experience itself, which 
he defines in this context as a sudden awakening to a transcendent other. 
In this way, both Zen and Pure Land arrive at similar religious territory. 
It is only in his later writings, however, that we have what we might call 
Suzuki’s final statements on jiriki and tariki understood on the one hand 
epistemologically, that is, jiriki as a means to get to tariki, and on the other 
hand ontologically, in a statement specifically on tariki as what I am calling 
the ontic presence of buddhahood attained in the world. 
Translating Shinran: The Kyōgyōshinshō
Let us now turn to another major expression of Suzuki’s view of Pure Land 
Buddhism: the translation he made of the first four fascicles of Shinran’s 
magnum opus, the Kyōgyōshinshō, the title of which he translated as The 
Collection of Passages Expounding the True Teaching, Living, Faith, and 
Realization of the Pure Land. Suzuki completed the initial draft in only 3 
months in 1961 but was never able to complete the project. He left behind 
only the first four of six fascicles when he died in 1966.
To date, there are four English translations of this work and in comparing 
them, we can reaffirm not only how much of the translator we read in any 
rendering of authoritative scripture, but also how much Suzuki’s approach 
differs from the others. In addition to Suzuki’s translation, there is one by 
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one included in The Collected Works of Shinran (hereafter CWS) published 
by Jōdo Shinshū Hongwanji-ha International Center —all of which are 
affiliated with the Jōdo Shinshū Hongwanji branch or Nishi Honganji 
church. Suzuki’s association with the Shinshū Ōtani-ha organization or 
Higashi Honganji should also be noted. All four were published in the 
postwar period, and only Yamamoto’s appeared before Suzuki’s. A marked 
up copy of the Yamamoto translation is among Suzuki’s books kept at 
the Matsugaoka Bunko, so we know that he consulted it. Yamamoto’s 
translation was truly pioneering, and we see how he struggled to convey the 
religiosity of the language, often selecting English prosody reminiscent of 
the King James translation of the Bible. By contrast the two later translations 
by Nishi scholars are more literal and somewhat flat. From the extant manu-
scripts of Suzuki’s translation at the Matsugaoka Bunko, we know that he 
agonized over how to translate such key notions as hongan, shinjin, and 
nenbutsu. Although eschewing the biblical approach of Yamamoto, Suzuki 
nevertheless comes down on the side of religiosity. That is, he does not 
hesitate to use language that conveys the emotive force of the text, even if 
that language violates the strict, literal meaning of the doctrines it represents. 
Still, there are places where his translation is more faithful to the text’s 
original intent than any of the other translations, especially those produced 
after his. Below, I will discuss Suzuki’s approach to translating certain key 
terms to highlight his perspective on Shinran and Shinran’s thought and then 
examine his overview of Shinran in his unpublished preface.
Ōjō as Awakening
One of the most crucial differences between the other three translations 
and Suzuki’s is his interpretation of ōjō 往生, which is generally translated 
as either “rebirth” or “birth in the Pure Land.” While the other translations 
consistently go to great lengths to mold their representations of Shinran 
as advocating the religious goal of reaching the Pure Land at death (even 
to the point in the CWS of adding language not in the original), Suzuki 
steadfastly refuses to read Shinran in this way. 
Siding with what may be called the mystical tradition of the Anjin 
ketsujōshō 安心決定鈔, an anonymous text on Pure Land thought and 
practice dating to the late Kamakura period, Suzuki takes a position more 
or less identical to his colleague Soga Ryōjin. He affirms the doctrine of 
kihō ittai 機法一体, or “unity of individual and Dharma,” from the Anjin 
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ketsujōshō. While there is a range of interpretations of this doctrine, the 
core principle expresses some sense of immanence of the sacred in the 
life or consciousness of the individual. Thus, ōjō interpreted according to 
kihō ittai is generally understood as a religious awakening that happens in 
life rather than in death. There is some question about where Shinran and 
Hōnen stood on this question, just as there is an ambiguity in the way this 
viewpoint is discussed throughout the Chinese Pure Land tradition as well. 
But in Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist, Suzuki makes his position clear:
Now we see that the Nembutsu, or the Myōgō, or the “Namu-
amida-butsu” is at the center of the Shin faith. When this is experi-
enced, the devotee has the “steadfastness of faith,” even before 
he is in actuality ushered into the Pure Land. For the Pure Land is 
no more an event after death, it is right in this sahālokadhātu, the 
world of particulars. According to Saichi, he goes to the Pure Land 
as if were the next-door house and comes back at his pleasure to 
his town.34 
When we look at how this issue of ōjō is expressed in the four translations of 
the Kyōgyōshinshō, Suzuki’s work clearly parts company with the other three.
This is evident in the way the different translations handle an interesting 
but somewhat ambiguous passage in the second fascicle, or Gyō no maki 
行巻, where the topic is praxis. In the following example, Shinran quotes 
from a commentary on the Guan wuliangshou jing 観無量寿経 (Sutra on the 
Contemplation of Immeasurable Life) written by the monk Yuanzhao (Jpn. 
Ganjō) mentioned above, a Vinaya master of the Northern Song dynasty 
who also advocated Pure Land thought and practice. In a statement echoed 
much later in both Suzuki and Soga, Yuanzhao affirms the importance of 
seeing all teachings and all practices in Buddhism as upāya, or expedient 
means. Below is (1) the original Chinese, (2) my literal translation, and the 




34 Suzuki 1957, p. 162.
35 Shinshū shiryō shūsei  (hereafter SSS) vol. 1, p. 121b. Yuanzhao’s work in three fas-
cicles is Guan wuliangshoufo jing yishu 観無量寿仏経義疏 (T no. 1754), and this passage can 
be found in T 37, 279b21–24.
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(2) My translation:
Vinaya Master Yuanzhao said, “It may be destroying illusion and 
realizing truth on this side which, as it is born by self-power, is 
discussed in the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna sutras. Or it may be 
venturing to that side, hearing the teaching and awakening to the 
path which, as it depends on the other-power, is explained as birth 
in the Pure Land. But though this and that [approach] may differ, 
do not deny that it is upāya that enables us to liberate our own 
minds.
(3) Yamamoto translation:
The venerable master Yuan-chao says: “Or as one in this world 
crushes out illusion and attains truth, one at once works out the 
Self-Power. And all the Mahayana and Hinayana sutras tell thus. 
Or one goes over to the Other World, hears, and attains the Way. 
As one rests on the Other-Power, birth in the Pure Land is talked 
about. There is a difference of the ‘other world’ and ‘this world’. 
And not one is not that which is not the expediency. This is but to 
make one awake in enlightenment.”36
(4) CWS translation:
Master Yüan-chao states: “In breaking through delusion and realiz-
ing true reality in this world, one employs self-power; hence [self-
power practices] are taught in various Mahayana and Hinayana 
sutras. In going to the other world to listen to the dharma and 
realize enlightenment, one must rely on Other Power; hence, 
birth in the Pure Land is taught. Although these two ways differ, 
they are both means [provided by Śākyamuni] for leading one to 
realization of one’s mind.”37
(5) Suzuki translation:
Ganjō the Vinaya Master says: It is on this side that appeal is 
made to the self-power to destroy illusions and attain the truth. So 
we talk about various sūtras belonging to the Mahāyāna or to the 
Hīnayāna. On the other side, the other-power is evoked in order 
to listen to the Dharma and be awakened in Enlightenment. So the 
36 Yamamoto 1958, pp. 63–64.
37 CWS, vol. 1, p. 60.
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sūtras talk about being born in the Pure Land. Though each has its 
own way, and one differs from the other, the essential thing is to 
realize one’s own mind in spite of methodological discrepancy.38
The point of the Yuanzhao passage is that the self-power forms of 
Buddhism rely on upāya no less than the other-power forms. This is solid 
Mahāyāna doctrine that was intended to show that Pure Land Buddhism is 
not significantly different from other forms of Buddhism. In his reference 
to “this side” and “that side,” Yuanzhao describes how these two different 
attainments are called “destroying illusion and realizing truth” and “birth in 
the Pure Land.” In regard to the latter he refers to standard Pure Land tropes 
such as “other-power” and “hearing the Dharma,” but he is somewhat 
vague about whether these practices take place in the here and now. That is, 
he does not explicitly state whether these are practices performed in order 
to get to the Pure Land, or after arriving at the Pure Land for the purpose of 
attaining buddhahood. Yuanzhao was most likely vague in order to include 
both possibilities. Suzuki’s phrase, “the other-power is evoked in order 
to listen to the Dharma and be awakened in Enlightenment,” is an astute 
translation of this passage that clearly expresses the centrality of the themes 
of praxis and upāya in the original. But notice how both Yamamoto and 
CWS move the practice and attainment associated with tariki to the Pure 
Land, stating “In going to the other world to listen to the dharma and realize 
enlightenment, one must rely on Other Power.” Thus in the perspective of 
the latter, tariki is necessary to get to the Pure Land, then and only then 
does praxis occur and then final liberation. But in Suzuki’s view, birth in 
the Pure Land is itself a form of upāya, merely another name for “evoking” 
the tariki that brings forth the sound of the Dharma in a way that produces 
awakening. The Yamamoto and CWS readings reflect the conviction that 
Shinran’s message to his followers was confirmation of the impossibility 
of religious attainment in this life. Thus one “goes to the other world to 
listen to the dharma and realize enlightenment” on “that side,” begging the 
question of how practice “on this side” could be meaningful. 
Nenbutsu as Thought
The notion of nenbutsu is absolutely central to Shinran and all of Pure Land 
Buddhism. In Japan, the person who endowed nenbutsu with such enormous 
38 Suzuki 1973, pp. 66–67.
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significance was Hōnen, and Shinran is explicit that his understanding 
of nenbutsu derives entirely from Hōnen. But nenbutsu was a complex, 
multidimensional notion by Shinran’s time, and has not been easily defined 
by anyone from the Kamakura period onward. 
One of Shinran’s famous contributions to Buddhist thought was to view 
his own nenbutsu practice as derived from the tariki-power of the Buddha. 
Indeed, when jiriki and tariki are discussed today, this point is often what 
defines the tariki position. It is also widely assumed that, following Hōnen’s 
insistence on the importance of verbalizing the nenbutsu, Shinran only used 
the word to refer to vocalizing the name of Amida Buddha. But what of the 
nen of nenbutsu when used alone? Outside the context of nenbutsu, the first 
syllable nen typically means to keep in mind, to concentrate on something, 
and is used as either a noun or a transitive verb. Even in modern Japanese, 
the word nenriki 念力 is used to mean “the power of concentrated thought.” 
What is often lost in reading Shinran and Hōnen is that their use of 
nenbutsu, while generally referring to recitation, never loses this dimension 
of psychological concentration. Indeed, it is important to keep in mind 
that Hōnen was breaking new ground by insisting that people reconsider 
the nenbutsu as a verbal practice but he never reduced it to a mantra by 
insisting that its power lies in its sound, regardless of the pracitioner’s 
mental state. In Shinran’s time debate continued unabated over precisely 
what the nen in nenbutsu was; he alludes to this controversy about the 
nature of nen to support Hōnen’s valorization of recitation nenbutsu, and I 
would argue that the Kyōgyōshinshō itself can be read as an apologetic for 
the Hōnen doctrine. In any case, it is important when reading both Hōnen 
and Shinran, and indeed any of the many Kamakura-period Pure Land 
thinkers, to remember that nen is multivalent. On this important point, 
the Suzuki translation stands out once again, this time for preserving the 
important dimension of nen as thought.
The differences in reading are most clearly visible in how the translators 
handle the word ichinen 一念, or a single nen, an evocative term in Japanese 
Pure Land doctrine because many among Hōnen’s disciples saw in it an 
expression of sudden enlightenment. Indeed, many scholars today place 
Shinran among that group, but this view is not normative for the institutional 
doctrines of many Shin sects, although I will not go into that issue here. 
Insofar as the word nen (Ch. nian) in sutra literature often translates 
citta in the sense of “individual thought,” and in all extant translations of 
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Sukhāvativyūhasūtra into Chinese the term ichinen (Ch. yinian) represents 
eka-citta, we know the original intention of the sutra’s Chinese-language 
translators was for ichinen to represent “a single moment of thought.” The 
term also famously appears in the passage which describes the fulfillment 
of the eighteenth vow of Amitābha in the Chinese translation attributed to 
Saṃghavarman (approximately third century) in the phrase naishi ichinen 
乃至一念, literally “as little as one nen.” It may be interesting to note here 
that this phrase in the extant Sanskrit version of this sutra contains the 
word citta, further showing that the word nen in this context originally 
refers primarily to an interior moment, though verbalization could also be 
occurring. In the Zen tradition, the word nen also has prominence in phrases 
like munen or “no thought.” As someone familiar with Sanskrit and Zen, we 
naturally find Suzuki to be keen on keeping the psychological dimension of 
nen prominent in translating Shinran. But his perspective is not universal.
Unlike the previous example, in the text below we are looking not at a 
quote from another source but Shinran’s own explication of the term ichinen 
in the chapter on practice in the Kyōgyōshinshō. Here is the original text 
followed by three translations. Because the three other translations follow 
the same course, I have limited this example to (1) Shinran’s text, (2) my 





Regarding the practice and faith of the merit-transfer directed 
toward reaching the Pure Land (ōsō ekō), practice has just one 
thought (ichinen) and faith also has just one thought (ichinen). In 
saying “the practice that is one thought” we are speaking about the 
number of times one recites the name [of the Buddha], by which it 
is revealed that the chosen easy practice [is] the ultimate [practice].
(3) CWS translation
Concerning the practice and shinjin that Amida directs to us for our 
going forth: in practice there is “one utterance” (ichinen), and in 
shinjin there is “one thought-moment” (ichinen). The one utterance 
39 SSS, vol. 1. p. 118b.
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of practice reveals, in terms of the number of voicings, the consum-
mation of the easy practice selected in the Primal Vow.40
(4) Suzuki translation:
As regards the living (practice) and the faith which make the 
outgoing ekō possible, there is “one thought of practice” and there 
is “one thought of faith.” By “one-thought of practice” is meant 
that according to the number of times the Name is pronounced, 
the ultimate significance of the practice chosen as the easiest is to 
be elucidated.41
In this passage Shinran distinguishes between a single nen of faith and a 
single nen of practice, highlighting faith as a realization, an attainment. In 
the case of practice, nen refers to the number of times the name is uttered. 
Because Shinran uses the word shōmyō 称名, “reciting the name,” to gloss 
nen in terms of practice, the text only makes sense to assume Shinran uses 
nen in the more general, Buddhistic sense of citta in the passage as a whole. 
We can thus paraphrase what Shinran is doing in this passage as follows: 
“Regarding the important matter of how we get to the Pure Land, first we 
transfer our merit toward that end, and then to ensure our success in this 
endeavor we must focus our efforts on one concentrated mental moment 
that is both a moment of practice and a moment of faith. And this only 
occurs when we recite the nenbutsu whereby that special psychological 
event is filled with the sound of the Buddha’s name, and when this happens 
this simple utterance is revealed to be the ultimate fulfillment of the path as 
chosen by the Buddha himself for us.” 
Here we see that Suzuki’s translation works better than CWS precisely 
because he keeps the sense of nen as thought. Suzuki only varies from the 
original in his abridged rendering of ōsō ekō 往相回向 as “outgoing ekō.” 
CWS, on the other hand, displays a strong tendency throughout to read 
nearly all instances of nen in Shinran as verbalized nenbutsu, of which the 
passage above is but one example. But the result is confusing for a number 
of reasons. First, the parallel structure of Shinran’s original language in 
the single thought of practice and faith is lost because nen in the former is 
rendered as an utterance and nen in the latter as a thought-moment. Second, 
Shinran’s explanation that nen here refers to vocalization is lost; it makes 
40 CWS, vol. 1, p. 55.
41 Suzuki 1973, p. 60.
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little sense to say that “utterance” means “voicing” so instead the translation 
renders this line to only be about the number of utterances. This is a major 
loss because the discourse context in which Shinran was writing—the 
apologetic aspect of the text—disappears when the tension between nen and 
shōmyō is removed like this. In ignoring the wider psychological meaning 
of nen, the Yamamoto, Inagaki, and CWS translations only make sense 
within the Shin community. But insofar as Shinran completed this work 
after returning to Kyoto and the communities that supported him at this time 
all lived outside the capital and are presumed to have had only minimal 
education, this is an anachronistic way of reading the Kyōgyōshinshō 
since in choosing to write this work in Chinese and filling it with copious 
quotations of sutras and patriarchs of East Asian Buddhism, his intended 
audience was the highly educated elite community of monks and aristocrats 
in the capital. It is ironic that while Suzuki’s writings on Pure Land as 
a whole evince only minimal knowledge of Shinran’s contemporaries 
compared to the other translators, it is the Suzuki translation that best 
represents how we imagine how the Kyōgyōshinshō was read in thirteenth-
century Japan.
Hongan as Prayer
Arguably the most interesting, even controversial, word choice in 
Suzuki’s translation of the Kyōgyōshinshō is his decision to use “prayer” 
to translate terms usually rendered as “vow.” The words used in Chinese 
generally include either the character yuan 願 (Jpn. gan) or shi 誓 (Jpn. 
sei), often together or in other compounds such as hongyuan 弘願 (Jpn. 
gugan), suyuan 宿願 (Jpn. shukugan), or hongshi 弘誓 (Jpn. gusei).42 When 
used together as shiyuan 誓願 (Jpn. seigan) the chances are good that the 
antecedent was praṇidhāna, as in shiyuan boluomiduo 誓願波羅蜜多 for 
praṇidhānapāramitā, one of the ten “perfections.” As all bodhisattvas 
take common vows and personal vows, originally the word benyuan 本
願 (Jpn. hongan) simply meant a vow taken in the past, as a translation of 
pūrvapraṇidhāna. But because the character ben 本 in Chinese also meant 
basic, original, or fundamental, this word was taken up by the Pure Land 
42 Both yuan 願 and shi 誓 can represent many different Sanskrit or Prakrit words. Yuan 
tends to represent words that suggest intention or wish such as forms of √iṣ, or conviction such 
as adhi+√muc (e.g., adhimukti). Shi implies some kind of promise, thus it was also used for 
pratijñā (claim), śapatha (oath), even satyavacana (“words of truth” as a kind of pledge).
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tradition as their standard name for vows of Amida (who, is said to have 
made twenty-four, thirty-six, or forty-eight individual vows, depending on 
the version of the sutra). The adoption of the moniker benyuan/hongan is 
not unique to Amida’s vows, but it adds solemnity and shows a development 
toward the mythic.
In Japan, Hōnen is very specific about calling the vows of Amida 
hongan. At times Hōnen uses hongan to designate all forty-eight vows and 
at times he uses it to designate only the eighteenth vow, following Shandao. 
Shinran is unambiguously devoted to his teacher Hōnen, and it is quite clear 
that Shinran’s faith was based in some kind of religious experience that 
confirmed Hōnen’s teachings. But how did Shinran understand hongan, and 
how should this word be translated? For translators with a knowledge of 
Sanskrit, like Suzuki and Inagaki, there are three contexts to consider: (1) 
India: should they ignore the associations with the Chinese word ben/hon 
and simply translate the Sanskrit pūrvapraṇidhāna that hongan originally 
represented, (2) Medieval China-Japan: should they try to communicate the 
linguistic associations Shinran must have felt in the word hongan apropos 
of similar Chinese-language Tendai jargon in his lexicon employing the 
same hon prefix, such as hongaku, honmon, honshin, honbutsu, honzon, 
honji, as well as Hōnen’s teaching on the universal significance of Amida’s 
gan as transcending the gan of other bodhisattvas and buddhas, or (3) 
Contemporary Japan: should they express the implications the Shin 
tradition today reads into Shinran’s usage of hongan? A similar problem 
exists with words like nenbutsu, which is a form of praxis but also a form 
of belief, and myōgō (Ch. minghao), the sacred name of a buddha that 
functions as symbol of that buddha, his power, vows, compassion, wisdom, 
achievement, and so forth.
To ascertain why Suzuki would translate hongan as prayer, we need to 
know what he understood both hongan and prayer to mean. Although he 
left no record of precisely how he understood the word “prayer,” Suzuki did 
leave written musings about translation difficulties, including some of the 
key doctrinal terms in Pure Land Buddhism. These statements are scattered 
throughout his writings from as early as 1902 to as late as 1966, and though 
varying in content do express a remarkable consistency regarding his 
perspective on how Pure Land Buddhism should be understood. And that 
perspective is strikingly mythic. In one way or another, Suzuki consistently 
rejects the temptation to create simple formulas and maligns those who 
want everything spelled out; for him, this is how religion dries up and loses 
54
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  3 9 ,  2
its salvific power. He tells a story, for example, in Shin Buddhism (1970) 
about a man named Shoma whom he describes only as a devoted Shin 
believer working as a day laborer, but whose biography must have come 
down as one of the “remarkable men” known as myōkōnin. Though unedu-
cated, Shoma’s understanding of the Pure Land episteme was so profound 
that people would travel great distances to meet him to obtain some kind 
of spiritual guidance. Suzuki relates a story of a man who travelled several 
hundred miles to speak with Shoma. Upon arrival, he found Shoma 
pounding rice, a tiring and repetitive task from which most people would 
enjoy a diversion. But despite the man’s pleas, Shoma would not even look 
at him, much less stop work to answer his questions. The family that had 
hired Shoma took pity on the man who had travelled so far and implored 
Shoma to take a rest and speak to him, but Shoma refused, so the family 
invited the man in for tea in the hopes that Shoma would soften. Finally 
as the man was about to leave, Shoma said, “If you are in such a desperate 
state of mind, you are altogether wrong in asking me about such things. 
Why don’t you ask Amida Sama himself ? He is the one who deals with 
such things. It’s not my business.”
This story can serve as a metaphor for Suzuki’s approach to Pure Land 
and indeed all Buddhism, which is one that stresses the imperative of per-
sonal affirmation of any teaching or doctrine. In other words, like Shoma, 
Suzuki believed that Pure Land Buddhism can only be understood through 
direct interaction with the myths, symbols, and metaphors of the tradition. 
Akin to the finger pointing at the moon in the Chan tradition, Shoma tells 
his visitor, “Look, you know where the moon is, how do you expect me 
to get you to see it?” The flip side of this, of course, is that Suzuki earned 
his living by writing and speaking about the moon—how people have 
thought about it, written about it, and so forth. This contradiction is also, 
oddly enough, typical of many influential modern Shin thinkers, and is 
particularly evident in Kiyozawa Manshi and Soga Ryōjin. Suzuki probably 
never met Kiyozawa, but as mentioned above he and Soga were friends. 
I believe there is evidence that specifically points to Soga’s influence on 
Suzuki’s thinking on Pure Land matters, and I will touch on that briefly 
below.
But to return to specific translation issues, there is considerably more 
material on what Suzuki did with the problematic word hongan than with 
prayer, so I will summarize the sources on the former first. The 1902 piece 
that I mentioned above is called Dokkyō sansoku 読経三則 (Reading Sutras: 
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43 SDZ, vol. 17, p. 45.
44 Suzuki 1963, p. 307.
Three Cases), originally published in the influential Meiji-period journal, 
Shin bukkyō (New Buddhism). The article is in Japanese but midway 
through he muses on the question of how a word like hongan-riki (the 
power of hongan) should be translated into English. In this case, the sutra 
quoted is not one narrating the myth of Amida but a textbook of Mahayana 
doctrines called the Mahāyānāvatāra (入大乘論, T no. 1634), the topic 
being the “traces” of the dharmakāya in the world and their impact. Suzuki 
does not mention Amida and the essay is only glossing a Chinese text into 
Japanese but nevertheless adds the following parenthetical comment (words 
that appear in English are in single quotes): 
Incidentally, putting hongan-riki into English as ‘Power of the 
former prayer (or prayers) of the Tathāgata’ would only be a 
literal translation, and there would be nothing worse than this 
to mislead those who do not know Buddhism. We search for the 
core and the expression of the dharmakāya existing from the 
ancient past, and we also wonder what ‘prayer’ would there be? 
The power of the hongan is an energy that pervades the universe, 
it is a magnanimous, expansive energy, it is ‘Will.’ In Christianity, 
this would be called ‘divine Will.’ One who believes in tariki 
gives himself over to the hongan of Amida without intervening 
diversionary thoughts; they are [like] those who believe in the 
Christian notion of ‘Let thy Will be done.’ I do not see any major 
gap between the two.43
From the same period we also have the following statement about 
praṇidhāna in his English language book, Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism 
(1907), a landmark publication at a time when few Sanskrit materials had 
come to light and historical Mahāyāna studies were just beginning:
Let me remark here, however, that “vow” is not a very appropriate 
term to express the meaning of the Sanskrit pranidhâna. 
Pranidhâna is a strong wish, aspiration, prayer, or an inflexible 
determination to carry out one’s will even through an infinite 
series of rebirths. Buddhists have such a supreme belief in the 
power of will or spirit that, whatever material limitations, the will 
is sure to triumph over them and gain its final aim.44
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What Suzuki does not seem to understand, at least in this passage, is that 
from a theological perspective, divine will and prayer are quite different. To 
wit, we expect God to have divine will but we do not expect him to pray; 
prayer only makes sense from the side of the created, not the creator. The 
idea of Yahweh having “an inflexible determination to carry out his will” 
or “a supreme belief in the power of will,” to borrow Suzuki’s language, 
implies the possibility of divine doubt in his own powers, which is not 
only incomprehensible for the Abrahamic God, it is incomprehensible for a 
buddha as well. Despite the fact that, unlike the Abrahamic God, buddhas 
frequently talk to their communities and use encouragement and admonition 
to communicate what they hope their followers will do, it is only Buddhists 
who have not yet attained buddhahood, i.e. “bodhisattvas” in Suzuki’s case, 
that maintain “a supreme belief in the power of will.”
Suzuki seems to have sensed some problem with this approach even in 
this early period because elsewhere he abandons “prayer” and goes back 
to “vow.” For example, in 1924 he published “Sayings of a Modern Tariki 
Mystic” in English about the myōkōnin Shichiri Gōjun 七里恒順 (1835–
1900) in The Eastern Buddhist.45 In this piece he uses “vow” and “Original 
Vows” exclusively, even glossing the latter in a note as a translation of 
pūrvapraṇidhāna, briefly explaining the story of Amida and his forty-
eight vows. In the Sanskrit-Chinese-English glossary included in his 1930 
Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, he glosses pūrvapraṇidhāna as hongan 
本願 and “original vow.”46 In another 1930 piece called “The Shin Sect of 
Buddhism,” published in English in the Osaka Mainichi (and reprinted in 
The Eastern Buddhist in 1939),47 Suzuki used “Original Vow” (singular), 
and “Amida’s vows” (plural). This essay is noteworthy in that he includes 
his own translation of the content of what he terms “the forty-eight vows” 
and even explains how the vows have been understood in Japan based on 
the Anjin ketsujōshō. Nowhere is there any mention of the word “prayer” or 
any discussion of a problem with rendering gan or hongan as “vow.”48 
When we move to the postwar period, we find Suzuki still struggling 
with the problem of translating hongan but he had found a new approach 
45 Suzuki 1924.
46 Suzuki 1981, p. 419.
47 The article appeared in the 23 May 1930 issue of The Osaka Mainichi & The Tokyo 
Nichi Nichi. The article in The Eastern Buddhist is D. Suzuki 1939.
48 Somewhat later, in 1939, Suzuki’s wife Beatrice also published a translation of Shinran, 
in this case, the San Amida butsuge wasan, in which she also uses “Vow” (B. Suzuki 1939, 
pp. 287–88).
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49 “Hongan no kongen” 本願の根元, SDZ, vol. 29, pp. 116–29. “Hongan” from 1931 is at 
SDZ, vol. 35, pp. 150–51.
50 This preface was discovered by Wayne Yokoyama in the attic of the library at the 
Matsugaoka Bunko.
51 See the description on the Otani University Museum’s website, “Daisetsu to Shinshū” 
大拙と真宗 (http://www2.otani.ac.jp/daisetsumuseum/catalog/d/img/074-2.html), a part of 
“Daisetsu: Sono hito to gakumon” 大拙：その人と学問. I would like to thank the Matsugaoka 
Bunko and Shinran Bukkyō Sentā for permission to use these materials here, and 
acknowledge the assistance of Wayne Yokoyama in bringing these to my attention. 
in the notion of immanence. In a 1961 essay entitled “Hongan no kongen,” 
he brings back an argument made in a brief statement in 1931 simply 
called “Hongan,” and mentioned above in his dialog with Soga Ryōjin.49 
Namely, that the hongan of Amida Buddha are the hongan of everyone. 
All bodhisattvas make hongan and as a collective spiritual force these are 
never exhausted; thus separating the hongan of Amida from the hongan of 
myself as an individual is delusional. Our dependence or reliance (sugaru) 
on hongan is therefore a working of the hongan that is the essence of myself 
as a spiritual individual. If we were to give up believing in what I can do as 
an individual, we give up believing in what the Buddha or any deity can do, 
and vice-versa. Thus belief in hongan means that we are bodhisattvas, that 
we are Buddhas. 
Returning to the Soga-Suzuki dialog mentioned above, what we see in 
Soga’s response to Suzuki’s radical internalization of the hongan is not an 
outright rejection but a felt need to clarify the situation. In Soga’s view, 
while Amida’s hongan may be identified with my hongan, my hongan are 
not Amida’s hongan but rather something incorporated within Amida’s 
hongan. Soga thus maintains a degree of transcendence in the Buddha 
that Suzuki wants to eliminate. I take this to be an example of Suzuki’s 
mythic approach to Pure Land thought that fuses the metaphysical with the 
mundane, and that stands in contrast with the de-mythologizing program 
of Soga in which human-as-mundane and Buddha-as-transcendent must be 
kept as facts of existential reality as is. 
This story takes another turn when we examine some unpublished 
materials that Suzuki wrote in the process of drafting his Kyōgyōshinshō 
translation that have recently come to light. I call the reader’s attention to 
two in particular: an unfinished Preface to the translation,50 and an offset 
printing of a draft of the translation sent in 1961 to Miyatani Hōgan 宮谷
法含 (1882–1962), the administrative head (shūmu sōchō 宗務総長) of the 
Ōtani-ha institution.51 The version of Suzuki’s translation that appeared post-
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humously in 1973 was significantly altered from this 1961 offset draft, and 
this Preface—a creative essay on Shinran’s thought—was never published in 
any form.52 Most importantly for this discussion, in the 1961 draft hongan 
is translated consistently as “vow” rather than “prayer.” In addition, the 
word gyō is rendered as “practice” instead of “living” as appears in the 1973 
published edition.
Interestingly, the unpublished (and unfinished in the form it was discovered) 
Preface contains a discussion of what the hongan express, the motivation 
behind them, and the difficulty of translating the concept. Throughout this 
essay Suzuki’s renderings of hongan are various: “resolve,” “prayer,” “vow,” 
and most commonly left untranslated as gwan, the romanization of the older 
Japanese pronunciation for gan. We can infer from this that Suzuki was 
having trouble deciding which word to choose and in discussing the concept 
retreated to not translating it at all. Akin to the example cited above where 
Shinran defines the single nen of practice as shōmyō, here Suzuki’s describes 
the meaning of gan and the longer form seigan 誓願 :
Gwan is the abbreviated form of Sei-gwan and praṇidhāna is 
its original Sanskrit form. Praṇidhāna literally means “to . . . . 
[incomplete]
Dharmākara’s “desire” or “wish” or “resolve” or “prayer” could 
not be expressed by a single gwan or sei. Gwan is “a wish” or “a 
prayer” and sei is “to vow” or “to pledge”. Either is a too weak 
term for the Bodhisattva’s inflexible will to carry out all his 
wishes for all beings in every quarter of the world, immensely 
extending in space and continuing everlasting in time. And he 
is proclaiming them not only before a single personage known 
as the Buddha World-Ruler but to every being in existence 
occupying every corner of space and every moment of time. The 
Chinese translation compounded gwan and Sei and coined a word 
sei-gwan though this was far from being satsifactory to cover 
the immensity of Dharmakara’s conception. The Chinese mind 
never had occasion to handle ideas of this magnitude as they 
encountered in the B[uddhist]. sutras. 
Pranidhana [sic] or Sei-gwan is generally rendered in English 
[as] “a vow”, but to my mind “vow” is too inane and misleading. 
52 The 1973 publication contains a foreword by Nishitani Keiji, an editor’s Preface by Itō 
Emyō and Okamura Mihoko, and a short (two-page) introduction by Itō Emyō.
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For Dharmakara’s [sic] resolute will is the direct reflexion of the 
highest and deepest Reality whose structure is Infinite Light and 
Eternal Life, Mahāprajñā and Mahākaruna [sic] or Mahakriyā, the 
48 “Resolutions” of the Bodhisattva sound too prosaic. The term 
Prayer I have adopted here is not quite appropriate either. For one 
thing it reminds us of [the] Lord’s Prayer. The fact is however 
that wherever new things or ideas are introduced we have to have 
correspondingly new words to which we are not at all used [to]. 
New wine is not to be put into old bottles. 
Dharmākara’s 48 gwan, though in reality numberless, are all the 
reflections of Infinite Light and Eternal Life which constitute the 
essence of Buddha. They are not mere earnest desires in vows 
on the part of Dharmakara as Bodhisattva. They all belong to 
him, they all issue from him. They are prayers originally making 
up his very being, and the prayers are not objectively directed 
to anybody outside himself. They are the Mahā Karuṇā. The 
Mahākaruṇā is the Mahāprajñā. Superficially they may appear 
contradicting each other, but in truth they are identified in the 
body of Amida as Dharmakāya. This truth of identity is then 
sheer given [>given sheer] expression in the original prayer as 
underlining the story of Dharmākara which is told in detail in the 
Larger Sutra of Amitābha Buddha.53
This would suggest that, despite his reservations and despite his call to 
“have new words” when needed, Suzuki did finally settle on “prayer” for 
hongan. This of course begs the question of what “prayer” meant to him. 
We know that he rejects the use of prayer as found in the Lord’s Prayer. We 
do find the expression “Amida’s Prayer” in his translation, however, which 
seems to me to be problematic. His statement that these are prayers “not 
objectively directed to anybody outside himself” is suggestive, however, 
and Suzuki’s mention of “desire” in the above suggests that the recent work 
of Hase Shōtō may be instructive here. Although Hase does not touch on 
the notion of prayer, in Yokubō no tetsugaku 欲望の哲学 (The Philosophy of 
Desire), he opines that a transcendent principle of desire at work is what we 
are seeing in the notion of the gan of Dharmākara, that as an expression of 
53 This preface will be included in the revised edition of Suzuki’s translation of the 
Kyōgyōshinshō that will be published from the Shinshū Ōtani-ha in commemoration of the 
750th Memorial Service for Shinran.
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hope this operates in an entirely different manner than the egoistic desire 
centered on oneself.54 Suzuki’s notion of prayer might thus be understood 
as a way of expressing Hase’s notion of nonegoistic or transmundane 
desire.
But the best tool for understanding Suzuki’s view of hongan is probably 
Soga Ryōjin, who is the Pure Land thinker whom I would argue had the 
greatest influence on Suzuki. With little of Soga translated into English at 
the present time,55 not much is known of his thought outside Japan, but 
suffice it to say Soga is one of the most influential Buddhist philosophers of 
twentieth-century Japan. Soga was very much a contemporary of Suzuki in 
terms of age (Soga was only five years younger than Suzuki and both lived 
to the age of ninety-five), and the two shared religious perspectives on a 
range of issues. Moreover the two men taught together at Otani University 
for many years and appear together in print in a number of places, so 
in addition to their commonality of professional concern and age, their 
friendship is also well-attested to. Although Suzuki does not specifically 
cite Soga as the source for his ideas, he does mention him in a number of 
his essays.
One of Soga’s most influential essays is “Chijō no kyūshu: Hōzō Bosatsu 
shutsugen no igi” 地上の救主 : 法藏菩薩出現の意義 (Savior on Earth: The 
Meaning of Dharmākara Bodhisattva’s Advent), published in 1913 in 
Seishinkai 精神界, the journal of the Seishinshugi movement founded by 
Kiyozawa Manshi.56 In this work, Soga argues forcefully that the hongan 
have salvific power precisely because they represent Dharmākara as a 
bodhisattva before he completed the path and became Amida Buddha. The 
vows symbolize a transcendent empathy in Dharmākara/Amida, but though 
we are attracted to the universal light of the Buddha as a symbol of ultimate 
wisdom, this is too remote to actually impact us individually. Even if the 
story of Dharmākara is conceived of as religious theatre, that is, as the 
Buddha manifesting as Dharmākara to bring his message closer to living 
beings suffering in this reality, nevertheless it is not Amida but Dharmākara 
who we can feel inside ourselves as we draw closer to the truth of the 
54 Hase 2003.
55 Jan Van Bragt made a serious study of Soga in his final years. His translations of three 
of Soga’s key essays will appear in Practicing Spirituality, Mark Blum and Robert Rhodes, 
eds., forthcoming from SUNY Press.
56 This can be found in SRS, vol. 2, pp. 408–21. A translation summary will appear in 
Practicing Spirituality.
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Dharma. The gap between human and Buddha is simply too great because, 
in Soga’s words, “the eternal Tathāgata of Unhindered Light stays on the 
level of an object of our yearning, in other words, on the level of our ideas, 
and as such cannot be our savior.”57
Soga insists on viewing the hongan as part of the practice of Dharmākara, 
and frequently refers to “the vows of Dharmākara” rather than “the vows 
of Amida.” This is immediately relevant to Suzuki’s description of the 
hongan as “Dharmākara’s ‘desire’ or ‘wish.’” The workings of the hongan, 
therefore, are meaningful because Dharmākara is, in Soga’s words, “born 
directly in the mind of human beings” and as such, the voice that calls 
us through the hongan arises within the breast of each person. Thus, “the 
hongan of Dharmākara Bodhisattva is called the ark on the great ocean 
of saṃsāra, intimating that the calling voice arises from the depth of my 
soul, from right under my feet.”58 The key is thus the participation of 
Dharmākara in our own subjectivity. 
Now while Soga never goes so far as to state that this participation 
means that it is us who proclaim the hongan, he does imply something 
very close: “As a human Buddha, Dharmākara Bodhisattva is, as such, 
the eternally existent Amida Buddha; at the same time, in another aspect, 
he is the true subject of the self that seeks salvation. I have expressed this 
idea with the words, ‘the Tathāgata is none other than myself.’”59 For 
Soga, then, Dharmākara is himself “the figure of the unity of ki (believer) 
and hō (dharma, tathāgata).”60 As seen above, Suzuki also likes to cite the 
phrase “the unity of ki and hō,” a trope common in Shin thought since at 
least Zonkaku 存覚 (1290–1373). But while Soga speaks of “Dharmākara 
becoming me,” he nevertheless recognizes that Dharmākara is still 
Dharmākara and precisely because of that power he is able to act as savior. 
Soga’s argument is strong because of the unique role of Dharmākara as 
both Tathāgata and ordinary person. Dharmākara is not only the object of 
the faith of the individual but also its “true subject” seeking that faith as 
well. Suzuki does not specifically distinguish Dharmākara from Amida as 
Soga does, but as mentioned above he nevertheless asserts a merging if not 
identification of the Buddha’s activities with one’s own activities, including 
the production of bodhisattva vows. In Suzuki’s language, true practice 
57 SRS, vol. 2, p. 410.
58 SRS, vol. 2, p. 412.
59 SRS, vol. 2, p. 413.
60 SRS, vol. 2, p. 413.
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only occurs when the subject disappears; in this move it is the practice that 
is identified with the subject. To wit, “The path is namu amida butsu, and 
the person is namu amida butsu. In other words, namu amida butsu treds 
the path of namu amida butsu.”61
What I am suggesting is that Suzuki’s concept of “prayer” reflects his 
understanding of Soga’s focus on Dharmākara as both subject and object 
of the hongan itself. Soga speaks of “pure practice” defined as the practice 
that is solely focused on realizing the truth of the hongan, and asserts that 
Dharmākara is both “the master of the hongan and its intended object.”62 
In a preface written for one of Soga’s books and dated 1963, Suzuki uses 
the phrase employed by Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 (1870–1945) indicating 
nondualistic perception, “the self-identity of absolute contradiction” (zettai 
mujun no jiko dōitsu 絶対矛盾の自己同一) to explain his own understanding 
of the paradox in Pure Land Buddhist thought as interpreted by Shinran 
and the Shin tradition. Although this piece was published in the time 
between the completion of his early draft of his Kyōgyōshinshō translation 
which uses “vow” for hongan and the final version which uses “prayer,” 
Suzuki unfortunately does not touch the subject of how to interpret gan 
within Soga’s system of thought or how to translate it. Through personal 
correspondence, however, I have received independent confirmation that in 
his last years teaching at Otani he discussed his decision to change “vow” 
to “prayer” along with another change for gyō 行 from “practice” to “living.” 
The latter change is less difficult, for there are numerous places where 
Soga and Suzuki both discuss Shinran’s understanding of common, daily 
experience as contributing to religious understanding. Suzuki is particularly 
enamored with the geta maker Asahara Saichi, a myōkōnin who relished 
the presence of the Buddha in his work to the point that he wrote, “[Amida-
sama,] do not take away my defilements (bonnō, Skt. kleśa), for if you do 
my gratitude will disappear.”63
In his 1962 lecture, “Waga shinshūkan” 我が真宗観 (My View of Shinshū), 
Suzuki refers to Meister Eckhart’s view that “Christ is born in my heart in 
each breath upon breath, moment upon moment,” which helps him explain 
how “a single breath of namu amida butsu can sweep away the evil karma of 
infinite kalpas.”64 And elsewhere in that work, “The Great Practice is where 
61 SDZ, vol. 35, p. 92.
62 SRS, vol. 2, p. 414.
63 Cited in “Hongan no kongen,” SDZ, vol. 26, p. 121.
64 SDZ, vol. 6, p. 350.
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Amida and I become unified as individual and Dharma (kihō ittai). . . . 
Thus, to chant the Name of Amida is to become that Amida whose name 
you chant.”65 Similarly, in Shin Buddhism, he writes, “Amida is really 
ourselves—this is the reason why we can accept the story of Amida so 
easily and understand the story of Shoma and other such devoted people.”66 
In the same work, he also speaks of “the perfect identity or absolute identity” 
of the sacred Name (myōgō) and the one who calls that Name.67
Suzuki easily, even eagerly, accepted the notion that Amida Buddha as a 
savior figure in all his symbolic representations (the sacred Name, nenbutsu 
practice, his vows made as Dharmākara, Dharmākara himself, Amida 
himself) can be identified with by the believer/practitioner. But as Soga 
reminded him, to say that “I identify with Amida” is not to say that “Amida 
identifies with me,” a crucial distinction in Soga’s shift in focus from 
Amida to Dharmākara. Perhaps because of his Zen-inspired perspective, 
Suzuki typically moves in the direction of eviscerating the self by means 
of transcending the self through identification with something beyond 
the self. This leads him to posit “the perfect identity or absolute identity” 
with Dharmākara, and thereby with everything in Dharmākara’s career, 
from five kalpas of contemplating his future Pure Land, to enumerating 
his praṇidhāna, to attaining buddhahood. Notice the contrast in their 
positions in the following dialog between the two men that was published 
posthumously in 1972:
Suzuki: Amida said that if he does not do this or that [if his vows 
are not realized], he himself will not attain perfect awakening and 
it is said that having attained complete awakening, [his] pure land 
was created. However, what I think, or what I believe or experience
—call it what you will—to my way of thinking, as long as I myself 
have not attained buddhahood, as long as I have not realized 
perfect awakening, then Amida has not attained buddhahood.
Soga: If you believe in the hongan of Amida, then you can be 
born in the Land of Bliss.
Suzuki: It is not enough to merely believe in the hongan of 
Amida. When Amida’s hongan becomes your own hongan, the 
complete awakening of Amida is accomplished and the Land of 
Bliss is created.
65 SDZ, vol. 6, pp. 356–57.
66 Suzuki 1970b, p. 36.
67 Suzuki 1970b, p. 55.
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Soga: Well, that point is rather difficult. When the hongan of 
Amida becomes your own hongan; you are quick to say that, but 
there seems to be somewhat of a problem in that way of thinking. 
Can Amida’s hongan become my hongan? There is a problem 
in whether or not this can be done. If you get to the point that 
you believe, then one could say that that belief must be the same 
thing as the hongan, for there would be a mutual similarity (sōtsū 
相通). Because there would be a mutual responsiveness (sōō 相
応), you could say that Amida’s hongan becomes my hongan, 
or that my hongan is absorbed into the hongan of Amida and is 
accomplished therein.68
Once again, Soga is at pains to fully accede to Suzuki’s immanent 
perspective, revealing Suzuki’s radical presumption that he can only 
understand the hongan when they become his own, and similarly that 
he must make a transition from sattva to buddha—just as Dharmākara 
Bodhisattva became Amida Buddha—in order to comprehend the meaning 
of the accomplishment of the vows. What this dialog suggests for the 
problem at hand is that Suzuki’s approach to the enigma of the hongan is 
to identify with Dharmākara such that Dharmākara’s gan become his gan. 
At the same time he never loses his perspective as Suzuki Daisetsu—in one 
late essay he describes his mind as being in the Pure Land, and his body as 
being in this saha world.69
This is where I think we can understand the notion of “prayer” resurfacing 
for him as an alternative, perhaps even better, translation for gan than desire, 
wish, or vow. There are of course many kinds of prayer; nonpetitionary 
prayer may express worship or gratitude, and so-called contemplative prayer 
aims at a heightened awareness of the sacred, but even these notions direct 
prayer at a transcendent authority. By contrast, Dharmākara’s “prayers” are 
directed downward at living beings mired in karmic restraints and Suzuki 
never speaks of directing the hongan at buddhas in the way that “prayer” 
is normally used. More likely is that Suzuki was thinking along the lines 
of “nonreferential” religious language encased in ritual as defined by 
Wittgenstein, perhaps even anticipating the work of D. Z. Phillips, whose 
interpretation of Wittgenstein’s analysis on the subject of prayer came out 
in 1966, the year Suzuki died. Islamic prayer has been seen as similarly 
68 SDZD, vol. 5, pp. 138–39.
69 SDZ, vol. 29, p. 125. 
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nonreferential, and many Buddhist ritual utterances, indeed the very notion 
of Bodhisattva vows itself, are nonreferential in that they avoid reference to 
any objectified listener.70
In conclusion, I would argue that the word “prayer” can be apropos if we 
view the hongan first, from Soga’s perspective as Dharmākara-centered rather 
than Amida-centered, and second, as meaningful to the “ordinary person” 
when they are embodied in a functional way within the individual. In other 
words, prayers as nonreferential aspirations in a Buddhist sense in that the 
person making the prayer and the object of the prayer are not distinguished. 
For Soga, both roles define who Dharmākara is. For Suzuki, these roles not 
only define Dharmākara but are also imminent within the individual aspirant, 
understood in the course of his/her everyday life by means of the “resolute 
will” that Suzuki idealizes in Buddhists down here on the ground. The term 
yokushō-shin 欲生心 (the desire to be reborn in the Pure Land expressed by 
an ordinary person, one of the so-called “three minds” doctrine in Pure Land 
discourse, is an example of a traditional doctrinal notion that reflects both 
aspects of Dharmākara’s “prayers”: imploring us to come to the Pure Land 
as well as us imploring him to help us get there. Thus it is not surprising 
that a synonym for yokushō is hotsugan 発願, “bringing forth one’s personal 
gan for birth in the Pure Land.” We easily forget that “to pray” also had a 
nonreligious usage when one wanted to entreat someone to do something. 
Though largely gone from our vocabulary today, by coming to America in 
the early twentieth-century, Suzuki may have learned this usage at that time, 
contributing to his lack of hesitation to use the word “prayer” to express 
entreaty or urging between living beings who have not attained buddhahood.
In recent years Suzuki has been examined critically for a number of his 
views on Zen and Pure Land, as well as bushido and nationalism, all of this 
separate from the difficulties that many have expressed regarding his final 
decision to translate gan or hongan as “prayer.” Leaving such critique aside, 
I have attempted to achieve the modest goal of highlighting some of Suzuki’s 
more interesting thinking related to Pure Land Buddhism. Admittedly, 
much of this thinking was colored by his background in Zen, especially his 
discussions of jiriki-tariki and the approach of his translation of Shinran’s 
Kyōgyōshinshō. As we have seen, jiriki and tariki have become reduced 
today into signs marking “Zen” and “Pure Land Buddhism” for many, the 
latter increasingly defined as Shinran defined it. Even in light of the Zen 
70 See Phillips 1966. See also Streng 1967 and Richards 1990. 
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influence, his translation of the Kyōgyōshinshō was very much a lively and 
thought provoking “Suzuki” reading of Shinran that opens up those words to 
much richer associations, and it is indeed regrettable that he died before he 
could translate the final two chapters of that work. Aided by the fact that he 
was not translating for an audience limited to Shin believers and his years of 
expertise in putting Japanese Buddhist sentiment into English, for this writer 
Suzuki’s translation achieves a degree of faithfulness not seen in the others, 
although it does employ some idiosyncratic choices of words. 
Like his admired Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882), Suzuki was a 
public intellectual, and the sheer volume of his writings is testament to 
that fact. In this essay, I have offered a window onto his perspective on 
Pure Land Buddhism, only one aspect of the D.T. Suzuki corpus but never-
theless important and largely neglected. Suzuki’s writings on this topic 
are far broader and deeper than what I have been able to muster here, but 
if this short piece leads to further studies on Suzuki’s view of Pure Land 
Buddhism, it will have been a meaningful effort. Comparing Suzuki to 
his contemporaries and friends, Nishida Kitarō and Soga Ryōjin, we find 
three different perspectives on what is essentially the same topic: religious 
experience. In general, Japanese scholars regard Nishida as having done 
tetsugaku 哲学 (philosophy), Soga as having done shūgaku 宗学 (sectarian 
study), and Suzuki as having done shisō 思想 (thought). It is this last cate-
gory that is, of course, the most difficult to explain as shisō combines the 
other two but also adds religious studies, aesthetic studies, and essentially 
any other form of cultural studies that the author finds relevant. As 
touched on above, compared to scholars of Pure Land thought like Soga, 
for Suzuki historical consciousness—in this context, concern for either 
what went before Shinran and Hōnen or what their contemporaries were 
saying—is only minimally evident in his writings. His interest is in ideas, 
not history, and criticism of Suzuki as burdened by a political naïveté is 
therefore somewhat justified, as it is for anyone focused on ideas and their 
relationship to experience, particularly when the topic is religion. Perhaps 
the best illustration of this is a statement made by Suzuki himself in the 
English language book, Shin Buddhism:
(James Bissett Pratt [1875–1944] and I) came to this conclusion: 
Myth and legend and tradition—tradition may not be a good 
term—and poetical imagination are actually more real than what 
we call factual history. What we call facts are not really facts, 
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are not really so dependable and objective. Real objectivity is 
in metaphysical subjectivity, you might say, metaphysical truth 
or poetic legend or religious myth. So we agreed that the Amida 
story has more objective and spiritual reality than mere historical 
truth or fact, and Amida has more metaphysical foundation 
than objective historical fact. Amida is really ourselves—this is 
the reason why we can accept the story of Amida so easily and 
understand the story of Shoma and other such devoted people.71
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